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Abstract 
In 2007 the European Union (EU) launched the Eastern Partnership, including 
the South Caucasus, while  simultaneously  addressing  Central Asia through a 
“Strategy for a New Partnership”. As the EU strategy towards Central Asia and South 
Caucasus (CASC) is being implemented and the Lisbon Treaty has given more tools 
for the EU to achieve greater coherence in its foreign policy, the question arises to 
what extent the EU’s strategy in the region is indeed coherent. Until now, the EU has 
not introduced any hierarchy between its objectives, but implements programmes 
and initiatives at various levels,  thus  making its strategy neither fully coherent nor 
sufficiently visible. If the EU wants its growing involvement to be translated into a 
bigger impact in CASC it has to achieve more coherence in its policy for and in that 
region. This paper provides both an analysis of the (in)coherence of the EU’s policy in 
the region and some recommendations  on  how coherence could be  further 
improved. 
 Laurène Aubert 
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Introduction: the EU, a late actor in an unstable region 
Common challenges 
  Central Asia comprises Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, while the South Caucasus region is made up of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia. The view of CASC as a region is “defined in terms of its common history, 
shared strategic assets, common concerns and challenges”.1 CASC countries face 
similar challenges: weak states, organised crime, corruption, poverty,2 high number 
of internally displaced persons, lack of foreign investment and trade and so forth.3 
CASC states are both a threat – due to their lack of political stability – and partners 
for attempts to secure the region. Current security issues are obviously related to the 
geopolitical concerns of the region –  mainly the Afghan war –  but they are also 
related to the lack of internal security. Indeed, “the black market  economy 
constitutes from 20 to 50 percent of Central Asian countries' GDP”,4  a market 
supplied with drug trafficking, extortion or prostitution. South Caucasus and Central 
Asia also “have in common the importance of themes like democratisation (more 
problematic in Central Asia than in the South Caucasus), the stimulation of inter-state 
cooperation in the region (which is a problem in both regions), education, youth 
programs, etc”.5 The collapse of the Soviet Union has created lawless areas in CASC. 
Finally, energy and security issues matter to all CASC states. These countries provide 
oil and gas and/or are important transit routes. Both energy producers and transit 
countries tend to face the same economic difficulties. The European Parliament has 
underlined  the interdependence of the two regions by calling South  Caucasus a 
“genuine gateway to Central Asia”.6   
 
                                                 
1 G.C. Maior & M. Mihaela, “The Black Sea region in an enlarged Europe: changing patterns, 
changing politics”, Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 16, no. 1, winter 2005, p. 33. 
2 In Central Asia forty to eighty percent of the population lives below the poverty rate. See B. 
Eisenbaum, Guerres en Asie centrale, luttes d'influence, pétrole, islamisme and mafias 1850-
2004, Paris, Grasset, Avril 2005, p. 150. 
3 B. Babajanian, S. Freizer & D. Stevens, “Introduction: Civil society in Central Asia and the 
Caucasus”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 24, no. 3, September 2005, p. 209. 
4  Translation by the author :  “A la fois conséquence et cause de l'état de corruption, 
l'économie parallèle représente entre 20 et 50% du PIB des pays d'Asie Centrale.” Eisenbaum, 
op.cit., p. 135. 
5 K. Tchanturia, “It Is More Apt to Speak of ‘Management’ than of ‘Resolution’ of the Conflicts 
in the South Caucasus”, Caucaz.com, 26 July 2007. 
6  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament: the European Union's relations with the South Caucasus, under the 
partnership and cooperation agreements, Brussels, COM(1999) 272, 7 June 1999. BRIGG Paper 1/2012 
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EU presence in CASC 
The EU has signed Partnership and Cooperation  Agreements (PCAs) with 
CASC states, the PCA with Turkmenistan is under ratification. The content of these 
PCAs illustrates a rather common approach to the region. In addition to these 
bilateral agreements, the EU has initiated several regional approaches regarding 
CASC: the “EC-Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia 2007-2013”,7 
the “EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership” (‘New Partnership’)8 and 
the “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”.9  Despite the 
interests at stake for the EU in the region, its willingness to be recognised as a major 
power and the existing competition with other international actors, the EU has shown 
little additional public commitment towards CASC. After the collapse of the USSR the 
EU was mainly concerned with the stability of its direct neighbours in Central and 
Eastern Europe; it had to deal with its own internal process;10 and the EU agreed with 
having the US in charge of the Western presence in the region.11 The EU opened its 
first Commission Delegation in 1994 in Kazakhstan and progressively offered PCAs to 
the countries of CASC.  
The increase of violence in the Northern Caucasus –  with the Second 
Chechen war – emphasised the need to strengthen security in the nearer Caucasus 
region, 12 and the Afghan war broadened the area that the EU considered crucial to 
stabilise. In 2005 the EU appointed a Special Representative for Central Asia and in 
2004 the EU started a regional political dialogue with Central Asian countries.13 In 
2007 the growing interest of the EU towards the region was illustrated by the 
adoption of two  strategies regarding Central  Asia, while the region of South 
Caucasus was specifically addressed through the launch of the Eastern Partnership. 
                                                 
7 European Commission, EC-Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia 2007-2013, 
Brussels, European Commission, 31 May 2007. 
8 Council of the European Union, The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership, 
Brussels, Council of the European Union, June 2007. 
9 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, 
Prague, Council of the European Union, 7 May 2009. 
10 E. Efegil, “The European Union's new Central Asian Strategy”, in E. Kavalski (ed.), The New 
Central Asia, the Regional Impact of International Actors, Singapore, World Scientific, 2010, p. 
71.  
11 Rahr in T. Paulsen & J. Jörg (ed.), “European policy towards Central Asia”, 137th Bergedorf 
Round Table, 4-6 May 2007, Astana, Hamburg, Körber-Stiftung, 2007, p. 53. 
12 Ibid.  
13 “The objectives of this dialog are : (a) to assist the regional countries to negotiate the issues 
of shared concern; (b) to give positive answer to the Central Asian states’ demands of having 
close relations with the Union; and (c) to support the European Union Commission’s Central 
Asia regional strategy”, in Efegil, op.cit., p. 79. Laurène Aubert 
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It seems that the EU’s policy towards the region “has evolved from a project-based 
approach to a new strategic partnership”14  but this strategy has not been much 
publicised.  
 
Coherence 
The term coherence has been the subject of heated discussions among 
scholars, its definition remains disputed. The terms coherence and consistency are 
used interchangeably in the EU treaties (with  variations depending  on  the 
language15). Cremona has defined the principle of coherence as a ‘multi-layered’ 
concept:16  coherence requires rules of hierarchy (the norms should not be 
conflicting), rules of delimitation (tasks have to be effectively allocated between the 
various actors) and finally principles of cooperation and complementarity (related to 
norms, actors and instruments).17 Cremona addresses both concepts of vertical and 
horizontal coherences.18  Vertical coherence “refers to the relationship between 
member states and Union action, in particular in contexts where the member states 
and the EU (or EC) may act simultaneously in relation to the same policy or subject 
matter”.19 Horizontal coherence “is the term used to refer to inter-policy and inter-
pillar coherence”.20 As Koehler has rightly pointed out, “coherence is a necessary 
precondition for the efficacy of foreign policy not only of the EU but of all 
international actors”.21 Coherence matters for the understanding of a given policy 
by the internal actors – in this case between the EU institutions, the EU actors on the 
ground and the member states – but also for its visibility on the ground. By analysing 
the  EU’s strategy in CASC through the  different layers  defining the concept of 
coherence,  this paper will assess the overall coherence of the EU policy towards 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 72. 
15 “While consistency is the preferred term in the English version of the EU treaties, the term 
coherence (Kohärenz, cohérence) is for instance used in the German and French version”, L. 
Den Hertog & S. Stroβ, “Policy Coherence in the EU System: Concepts and Legal Rooting of 
an Ambiguous Term”, conference paper The EU as a Global Player, Madrid, 7-8 April 2011. 
16 M. Cremona, “Coherence through Law: What difference will the Treaty of Lisbon make?”, 
Hamburg Review on Social Sciences, vol. 3, no. 1, June 2008, p. 14. 
17 Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
18  C. Portela &  K. Raube, “(In-)Coherence in EU Foreign policy: exploring sources and 
remedies”, Paper presented at the European Studies Association Bi-annual Convention, Los 
Angeles, April 2009, p. 2. 
19 Cremona, op.cit., p. 16. 
20 Ibid. 
21 K. Koehler, “European foreign policy after Lisbon: strengthening the EU as an international 
actor”,  Caucasian Review of International Affairs, vol. 4, no. 1, winter 2010, p. 57; and P. 
Gauttier, “Horizontal Coherence and the External Competence of the European Union”, 
European Law Journal, vol. 10, no. 1, January 2004, p. 24. BRIGG Paper 1/2012 
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CASC. It is argued that the EU’s policy towards CASC faces some reasons to increase 
its coherence, which exists but is still limited. By doing so, the EU might become a 
more visible and credible actor in CASC.     
The following section introduces the geopolitical game in CASC, and then the 
paper will analyse the coherence of the strategy, programmes and actors of the 
EU’s policy towards CASC. 
 
CASC, the new heartland 
The region has become a key focus in various international relations theories, 
from the concept of heartland22 to the idea of a ‘great game’.23 For some authors, 
these concepts originating from the nineteenth century became once again 
relevant to describe the status and the ‘power game’ happening in CASC after the 
collapse of the USSR,  as this created a strategic ‘vacuum’ that called for a new 
resolution.24 The enlargements of 2004 and 2007 were also crucial in strengthening 
the importance of CASC for the EU as they brought these countries into the EU’s 
‘near abroad’25 and therefore highlighted possible challenges to Europe’s security. 
After the Eastern enlargement, the EU decided to increase its efforts in the region by 
solving some ‘frozen conflicts’ which “form the major obstacle on the region’s path 
towards stability and prosperity”.26 The significant involvement of the EU in efforts to 
resolve the Georgian war of 2008 has indicated a broader commitment of the EU to 
bring stability in the region. The high cost of its involvement might have diminished 
the willingness of the EU to consider military intervention in the region for the time 
being.27 The limited response of the EU to the unrest in Kyrgyzstan and its inability to 
solve the conflict in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh illustrate the limits of the peace-
making capacity of the EU. 
                                                 
22 H. Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, The Geographical Journal, vol. 23, no. 4, 
April 1904. 
23 R. Kipling, Kim, New York, Doubleday, page and company, 1901. 
24 Interview with Olivier Roy, Professor at the European University Institute, former head of the 
OSCE mission to Tajikistan, Florence, 28 March 2011. 
25 A. Agh, “Regionalisation as a driving force of EU widening: recovering from the EU ‘carrot 
crisis’ in the ‘East’”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 62, no. 8, 29 September 2010, p. 1239. 
26  A. Labedzka, “Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)”, in S. Blockmans 
(ed.),  The European Union and its neighbours, a legal appraisal of the EU’s policies of 
stabilisation, partnership and integration, The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Institute, October 2006, p. 
583. 
27 Interview with Olivier Roy, op.cit. Laurène Aubert 
8 
9/11 and the following invasion of Afghanistan have been crucial in defining 
the region as the new ‘heartland’. In addition to the strategic location of CASC to 
host military bases, there were also links between some Islamic activists –  notably 
from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan – in Central Asia and the Afghan conflict.28 
These elements made the region a crucial area to stabilise in order to solve29 and to 
avoid a spread of the Afghan conflict.30  The growing EU interest in improving its 
energy security also explains to a large extent the renewed European involvement in 
CASC.31  Indeed,  from 2001 onwards,  “Brussels has unfurled the so-called ‘Baku 
Initiative’ and the establishment of a European Union Energy Transport Corridor”.32  
According to Oliver Roy, the risk of an Islamic uprising in Central Asia is now 
very limited,33 nonetheless the EU – in its willingness to help the implementation of 
stability in the region – should watch the development of Islamic movements (like 
jadidism) and start developing an expertise on the subject. The EU could develop a 
fruitful approach by understanding that the region hosts Islamic movements which 
could be rather beneficial to the implementation of more democratic34 and unified 
states. The EU could increase its relations with these movements to strengthen the 
civil society and prevent the rise of extremist Islamists coming from outside.35 Rashid 
argues that the situation in Central  Asia  can only  improve if the international 
community understands how this region can impact the future of the rest of the 
world.36 European political leaders need to understand the geopolitical interests at 
stake in the region.37  
The EU’s involvement in CASC is determined by external factors, indeed the 
EU’s role in the region is influenced both by its own relations with the other powers 
                                                 
28 A. Rashid, Asie centrale, champ de guerres, cinq républiques face à l’islam radical, Yale 
University, Paris, Autrement, 2002, p. 13. 
29 European military officer interview in Almaty, 10 February 2006, in International Crisis Group, 
“Central Asia: what role for the European Union?”, Crisis Group Asia Report, no. 113, 10 April 
2006, p. 10. 
30 Rashid, op.cit., p. 50. 
31 Beck in Paulsen & Jörg (ed.), op.cit., p. 55. 
32 Efegil, op.cit., p. 79.  
33 Interview with Olivier Roy, op.cit. 
34 Rashid, op.cit., p. 39. 
35 International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: what role for the European Union?”, op.cit., p. 25. 
36 Rashid, op.cit., p. 7.  
37 “Central Asia is anonymous in the West because it’s been relatively stable. If it becomes 
unstable, it will no longer be anonymous, and people will ask why we weren’t interested 
earlier”, interview conducted by ICG in Bishkek January 2006, in International Crisis Group, 
“Central Asia: what role for the European Union?”, op.cit., p. 1. BRIGG Paper 1/2012 
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acting in  the region and by the direct influence of these powers on the ground. 
Despite a growing number of actors in CASC (Turkey, Iran, and India for example) 
the following section will focus on the main actors in addition to the EU: Russia, the US 
and China. 
In CASC, Russia remains a major power on all levels;38 it is trying to recover its 
role in its ‘near abroad’.39 Nevertheless, the nature and extent of Russia’s will and 
ability to intervene in CASC is a complex issue despite a new willingness of Russia not 
to be marginalised.40 The successive changes of Russia’s policy towards Central Asia 
and the internal contradictions of this policy,41 as well as external factors, have led 
Central Asian governments to consider that Russia is no longer the primary ally on a 
long-term  basis.42  However,  the geographical proximity of Russia makes a full 
withdrawal of Russian influence from the region highly unlikely – despite its cost43 – so 
long as Russia is not willing to outsource its role to another international actor such as 
China. Recently it seems that Russia has adopted a more cooperative approach 
towards external powers in the region than before.44  
China’s role in the region – especially in Central Asia – has undoubtedly risen 
these past few years, yet China still appears  as an unpredictable45  cold-hearted 
partner.  According to an adviser of a Kazakh eighteenth century leader,  “the 
Russian yoke is made of leather. It can gradually be worn out. But the Chinese yoke is 
made of iron. One can never free oneself from it”.46  Kurt  Wagner underlines that 
indeed the fear of China in Central Asia is overwhelming.47 The main Chinese ploy to 
                                                 
38  M.  Laruelle, “Russia and Central Asia”,  in  E.  Kavalski (ed.),  The New Central Asia, the 
Regional Impact of International Actors, Singapore, World Scientific, 2010, p. 149. 
39 “According to the ‘Primakov doctrine’, part of Russia's attempt to regain its international 
status involved recovering its role as a center of influence over the post-Soviet space”, ibid., 
p. 157.  
40  R. Menon, “The New Great Game in Central Asia”, Survival, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, vol. 45, no. 2, summer 2003, p. 192. 
41  A. Kazantsev, “Russian policy in Central Asia in 1991-2010: a disappearing power?”, 
European University Institute working papers, Florence, RSCAS 2010/59, July 2010, p. 34.  
42 Ibid., p. 15. 
43 “According to the Agreement of 1992 Kyrgyzstan delegated the issues of protection of the 
border with China to the border troops of Russia. […] Russia paid 80% of costs of these 
troops”, ibid., p. 13. 
44 Laruelle, op.cit., p. 167. 
45 Rashid, op.cit., p. 178.  
46 The author of this quote was Buhar-Jirau, an advisor to Abulai-Khan, quoted in Kazantsev, 
op.cit., p. 25. 
47  Interview with Kurt Wagner, Country Director of the GIZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit) Regional Office in Kyrgyzstan, Bruges, 7 April 2011. Laurène Aubert 
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gain greater control over the region has been through the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organisation (SCO)  –  where China's leading influence is clear  and where the 
principle of national sovereignty is emphasised.48 China’s influence is not limited to 
economic affairs, for example China has been pressuring bordering countries not to 
give asylum to Uighur 'dissidents'. For some observers China might become  – 
especially in Central  Asia  –  the successor of a colonial Russia: a concern 
strengthened by the fact that China is stronger than ever in the region49 and that it 
builds its strategy on a very long-term approach.50  International actors in CASC 
expect China’s role in the region to grow in the upcoming years.51 
“The Southern Caucasus and Central Asia are important parts of the United 
States’ global strategy”52 and 9/11 increased the geo-strategic importance of the 
region,53 an importance that was stressed by President George W. Bush more than 
any other American administration.54 Meanwhile, signs of a real American presence 
on the ground are lacking, and some authors even claim that “the presence and 
influence of the United States in Central Asia are at a historical low”.55 After 9/11 it 
became crucial for the US to prevent a spread of the Afghan conflict and the US 
government had to cooperate with the established governments to obtain military 
bases on their territory. The US government was thus torn between the necessity to 
cooperate with authoritarian governments and its role of promoting political and 
socio-economic reforms: a dilemma that has been hindering US policy in the region 
since 2005 and damaging the credibility of US foreign policy.56 By focusing too much 
on the security aspects in the region, the US has partially failed to deal with some of 
the other sources of instability.  Alongside these and other factors, the lack of 
coherence of US policy had a negative impact on US influence in CASC.57 
                                                 
48  M. Clarke, “China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: the Dynamics of 'New 
Regionalism', 'Vassalisation', and Geopolitics in Central Asia”, in E. Kavalski (ed.),  The New 
Central Asia, the Regional Impact of International Actors, Singapore, World Scientific, 2010, p. 
122. 
49 Ibid., p. 146. 
50 Interview with Olivier Roy, op.cit. 
51 Clarke, op.cit., p. 145. 
52 Labedzka, op. cit., p. 589.  
53 M. Fumagalli, “The United States and Central Asia”, in E. Kavalski (ed.), The New Central 
Asia, the Regional Impact of International Actors, Singapore, World Scientific, 2010, p. 179. 
54  According to Olivier Roy, the Bush administration had an active policy in the region. 
Interview with Olivier Roy, op.cit. 
55 Fumagalli, op.cit., p. 177. 
56 A. Cooley quoted in ibid., p. 184. 
57 Ibid., p. 185. BRIGG Paper 1/2012 
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Russia,  China or  the US have  not  so far offered a convincing model of 
multilateral governance for Central Asia or CASC as a whole. This is mainly due to 
their focus on national interests as a bottom line, their tendency to solve key issues 
through bilateral deals,  and the weaknesses of the CSTO and SCO as regional-
building processes.  Besides being in accordance with general EU foreign policy 
principles, a multilateral approach to the region initiated and coordinated by the EU 
appears as one of the main assets for increasing EU influence in CASC.58  A 
multilateral approach is more relevant to the reality of the supposed ‘New Great 
Game’ as there is no ‘zero-sum game’.59  
It makes strategic sense for the EU to adopt a ‘softer’  approach than the 
other large powers, as it cannot hope to expel any of these powers from an eventual 
‘great game’ and must thus make the best of its ‘soft power’ image. “One of the 
main advantages of the European Union, thereby, not least because of its reticence 
to get involved more proactively in Central Asia during the 1990s, is that it is not 
perceived as a threat by either external or regional actors”.60 Overall, the general 
status of the EU as an international power is highly influenced by the evolution of 
other international powers. “[T]he faster we integrate the states of Eastern Europe 
and the South Caucasus with the EU, the more likely it will be that Russia itself adopts 
a pro-European orientation”.61 On the ground, the EU is influenced by the willingness 
of actors of other countries to cooperate, the staff members of the EU Delegations 
underline that the individual representatives  of these actors impact multilateral 
cooperation on the ground.62 In the end, “the Europeans need to ask themselves 
which of the two images of the region they wish to have at the back of their minds 
when pursuing their policies for the Central Asian countries – the ‘Silk Road’ or the 
‘Great Game’”.63 
The absence of an indisputable leader among the international actors present 
in CASC, and the failure of Russia, China and the US to appear as trustful actor with a 
                                                 
58 Efegil, op.cit., p. 87. 
59 L. Jonson, “The new geopolitical situation in the Caspian region”, in G. Chufrin (ed.), The 
Security of the Caspian Sea Region, Oxford, SIPRI, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 12. 
60 Efegil, op.cit., p. 87. 
61 Statement made by the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2009, Radoslaw Sikorski, quoted 
in Agh, op.cit., p. 1249.  
62 The head of the operation section in the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan explains that currently 
the local representative of USAID is really open to cooperate with the EU, while in Tajikistan 
the representative of Russia seems also willing to work with the EU. Interview with Tom Massie, 
Head of operation section, EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan, Bishkek, 27 April 2011.  
63 Imanaliev in Paulsen & Jörg (ed.), op.cit., p. 57. Laurène Aubert 
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coherent strategy leaves space for a  bigger presence of the EU in CASC. The 
influence of Russia, China and the  US  in CASC suffers  from their  a strong  and 
incoherent attitude. As the  EU  is  already perceived as a rather ‘soft power’,  its 
current approach should be to work on the coherence of its policy. This paper will 
assess how coherent the EU policy towards CASC is and suggest ways of improving 
the coherence of this policy.  
 
The coherence of the EU strategy towards CASC 
Among  the priorities defined in  the  EU’s  documents is the idea of promoting 
integration of the whole region.64 During the political meetings with leaders of CASC 
energy and security issues have been mentioned the most.65  Nevertheless,  the 
various documents about the EU's policy in the region present quite a broad strategy 
in terms of the subject they deal with. The variety of fields covered by the EU's policy 
in CASC illustrates the ‘soft power’ dimension as the EU tries to influence the countries 
on  ‘non-hard’  security issues such as education  or civil society. The head of the 
operation section in the EU Delegation in Kyrgyzstan reports that in the last multi-
annual  indicative programme the strategic objective for the Kyrgyz National 
Indicative  Programme in 2011-2013 are: social protection reform and income-
generating activities, education reform and judicial reform and the rule of law.66 The 
Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) Indicative Programme for Central Asia 
for 2011-2013 allocates significant funding for education, rule of law, health, social 
and economic reforms.  
Creating coherence at the implementation level is harder for an EU which is 
deprived of its main  ’carrots’  and  ’sticks’. By refusing to offer an enlargement 
prospect to CASC the EU has abandoned its main incentive to make the states 
comply with the EU principles, the EU might be facing a ‘carrot crisis’.67 In addition to 
the current lack of incentives, the avoidance of the ‘integrative balancing’ method 
used during the enlargement process leaves the EU without a well-known efficient 
                                                 
64 Lucas, in ibid., p. 55. 
65 It might be useful to recall that the oil and gas produced in this area are far from being 
sufficient to feed EU energy needs.  
66 Interview with Tom Massie, op.cit. 
67 Agh, op.cit., p. 1241. BRIGG Paper 1/2012 
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mechanism to deal with these countries.68 These incentives became crucial with the 
growing awareness among governments  of CASC that –  in the renewed 'great 
game'  –  they are now decisional actors.69  The reality of this weakness has been 
illustrated by the inability of the EU to achieve any progress on human rights in 
Uzbekistan despite the sanctions it imposed on the country after the governmental 
repression in Andijan in 2005.70 In Turkmenistan too, the EU has been so far unable to 
improve a catastrophic situation with regard to human rights. Regarding the possible 
'sanctions' for the non-compliance with the EU’s requirements in the region, the EU 
does not have much more than the possibility to reduce its financial contribution.71 
But the existence of significant energy resources in the most authoritarian countries of 
the region generates high incomes and limits the impact of such sanctions.72 Despite 
a clear acceptance in Brussels that the CASC countries are not expected to join the 
EU on a short-term basis, it seems that the EU still thinks its strategy towards the region 
is providing enough leverage to influence these countries.73  This position is 
strengthened by the statements of the EU actors on the ground which indicate that 
for Central  Asia  the EU is still working on the basis of the strategy for a ‘New 
Partnership’ of 2007 which will not be reconsidered soon.74 
The various initiatives of the EU towards CASC illustrate both a growing interest 
of the EU in the region and its difficulty to encompass in one structure this region 
stretching from Turkey to Russia. The regional approach the EU has been trying to 
implement can be qualified as an ‘EU outside conception’ – that is, a vision of the 
region imposed from outside – because no regional mechanism pre-existed and the 
EU has carried out the strategic, conceptual and managerial bulk of the work.75 The 
attempts of the EU to promote regional integration, even in such unpromising 
                                                 
68  “The EU has not extended the ‘integrative balancing’ method to the ENP. Integrative 
balancing implies that the new units have an institutional or structural synergy in which, in the 
spirit of partnership principle, the composed capacities of the participants create a 
balanced situation for representing the common interest”, ibid., p. 1245. 
69 Rashid, op.cit., p. 181. 
70 S.E. Cornell, “Commentary, so far, Europe's approach to Central Asia has been moralistic 
and counter-productive”, Europe's World, spring 2007, p. 19. 
71  S. Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy, “Eastern 
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environments, can be related to the idea that the EU – as a regional actor – finds it 
more effective and natural to deal with other regional organisations. Various forms of 
‘regional community’ for the EU neighbouring countries can be identified: economic 
community, fair neighbourhood community  (this type of community requires 
controlled migration among its members), security community, democratic 
community, cultural community.76  Yet,  it remains unclear from the EU strategy 
towards CASC which one(s) the EU would like to promote in the region. Though the 
EU Special Representative in Central  Asia  has stressed Europe’s wish to see more 
regional integration in Central Asia,77 this European desire can be opposed to the 
lack of CASC willingness to do so.78 
The EU’s difficulties in approaching the actors of the region are consequently 
due to the lack of clearly defined regional structures as well as dissensions among 
the CASC states themselves. The frozen conflict of Nagorno-Karabakh appears as 
the main issue among CASC, but the Tajik civil war also had some consequences for 
bordering countries and the recent events in Kyrgyzstan impacted Uzbekistan. For 
Olivier Roy, there is a lack of trust among Central Asian governments: they have to 
cooperate on certain matters and they are signing some common agreements, but 
they are  often  reticent mainly because their political leaders are obsessed with 
holding on to power and are afraid of anything that will weaken their position, be it 
an internal or external threat.79 In addition, some of the states in the region have 
been trying to use a possible process of regional integration to their own 
advantage.80  Both the regional or the bilateral approach have their advantages 
and disadvantages in terms of influencing the region, but the lack of explicit choice 
between one or the other has been hindering the EU’s productivity.81 By saying that 
“Brussels must achieve a balance between multilateral and bilateral approaches”, 
the EU Special Representative for Central  Asia  indicates that the EU has still not 
decided on a precise approach.82 
                                                 
76 Agh, op.cit., p. 1243. 
77 Morel in Paulsen & Jörg (ed.), op.cit., p. 48. 
78 Rahr in ibid., p. 49. 
79 Interview with Olivier Roy, op.cit. 
80 “It seems that Kazakhstan, above all, is particularly interested in regional integration, and 
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Rühe in Paulsen & Jörg (ed.), op.cit., p. 52. 
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Overall, the EU lacks: a clear set of priorities in its policy towards CASC, real 
incentives to influence political leaders in CASC and a clearly defined (bilateral or 
regional) approach. This paper suggests that the EU has to choose its priorities and 
that it should do so by  focusing on issues where the other external powers are 
absent. The EU should define clear priorities and avoid ad hoc responses to crises in 
the region. The instability of the region may result in future crisis, like the past unrest in 
Kyrgyzstan or the war in Georgia. These events require short-term reactions which 
differ from a long-term strategy. The EU needs to work on creating incentives. It could 
use its rather positive image in the region and try to become a role model. It seems 
unrealistic  that the EU chooses  only a regional or a  bilateral approach, both are 
necessary due to the common issues of the region and the different agendas of the 
leaders in CASC. Nevertheless, EU documents and implementation measures should 
indicate which issues are being addressed through bilateral or regional policies.  
 
The coherence of EU programmes in CASC 
The EU has implemented PCAs in almost all the countries in the region, but 
their  ‘one-size-fits-all’  character83  and the slowness of their implementation have 
made them less efficient than the regional initiatives such as the Central Asia Drug 
Action programme (CADAP) or Border Management in Central Asia (BOMCA). By 
focusing on specific issues and region, these programmes  have  resulted in the 
implementation of concrete measures that have been quantified. PCAs appear as a 
sign of political cooperation rather than real commitments to engage in common 
projects. They represent the earliest and most basic type of EU interaction. The first EU 
programme implemented in the region was the Technical Aid to the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (TACIS) which is currently coming to an end, and the main 
programmes in the region no longer deal with the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)  as a whole. TACIS  dealt with all members of the CIS  but it lacked a 
political strategy and was functioning as a supplier of development aid. Ultimately, 
“the TACIS programs had little impact on society as they were dealing mainly with 
the government and had rather low-profile activity”.84  The principle of 
                                                 
83  “A senior Commission official noted that the PCA model (like TACIS) was designed for 
countries at the level of development of Russia and Ukraine and thus is ill-suited for the 
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January 2006, in International Crisis Group, “Central Asia: what role for the European Union?”, 
op.cit., p. 18. 
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complementarity is hindered by the nature of these programmes which juxtapose 
rather than complement each other.  
The EU has developed a broad set of programmes which address economic, 
social  and  political issues, and to a certain extent security issues. This approach 
seems to be necessary given the interdependency of the problems in CASC, where 
stability is increasingly undermined by non-traditional threats. Yet,  the EU 
programmes are quite heterogeneous: on the one hand, the programmes dealing 
with energy and security occur at a regional level with more cooperation or even 
leadership by other actors such as Interstate Oil and Gas to Europe (INOGATE). On 
the other hand, issues of human rights, democracy and rule of law are often part of 
the EU’s bilateral programmes. The EU also leaves some policies to be dealt with by 
the  member  states such as health policy.85  Currently the rules of delimitation 
between the actors at stake in the implementation of EU policy have been well 
adhered. The actors in CASC have not shown decreasing or increasing reluctance to 
cooperate in bilateral nor  in multilateral initiatives and there has not been strong 
disagreement between EU member states and  other  EU actors. The current 
allocation of policies to various actors has not resulted in major discrepancies 
regarding the implementation of EU policies in CASC. 
Drug trafficking and corruption, which are part of a ‘vicious cycle’ leading to 
the reinforcement of both, should be faced by the EU’s programmes as the money 
made through this trade can be used to destabilise the region. For example, such 
money  funded the Kyrgyz revolution of 2005.86  The decision of the EU to discuss 
cooperation regarding environment and water supplies illustrates the strategic role 
the EU can play concerning important – but little publicised87 – matters on which 
other international actors are not yet acting. The EU programmes regarding 
infrastructure in the region also create an added value which should not be 
underestimated as they connect the different countries in the region. This aspect has 
been acknowledged by the EU, as two of the main programmes supported by the 
EU concerning CASC are TRACECA and INOGATE, both focussing on energy and 
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86 N. Swanström, “Traditional and non-traditional security threats in Central Asia connecting 
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transportation issues.  The awareness that “Europe will encounter difficulties relying 
only on the Middle East and Mediterranean sources of oil and gas”88  is currently 
growing, increasing the role of CASC’s for EU’s energy security.  The EU has been 
quite successful in understanding the broad list of issues to be addressed. This 
understanding is necessary but not sufficient for establishing a coherent policy. 
The analysis of the other international actors’ policies has shown that 
ambitious comprehensive policies addressing the region as a whole are necessary to 
impact CASC. This paragraph considers the ability of the EU to fulfil these criteria. The 
first approach of the EU  to the region has consisted in  implementing technical 
programmes without an ambitious political strategy, and it was a failure for various 
reasons such as the lack of financial investments.89 The EU’s policy towards CASC 
benefits from additional  funding,  the Central  Asia  DCI Indicative Programme  for 
2011-2013 foresees a cost of order of € 321 million and the Eastern Partnership has led 
the Commission to earmark € 600 million for 2010-2013.90  The Central Asia  DCI 
Indicative  Programme underlines that the average annual budget under DCI will 
increase  by  around twenty-one per  cent in comparison with the Central  Asia 
Indicative Programme of 2007-2010.91 The EU has increased its contribution to CASC 
since the ‘New Partnership’ and the Eastern Partnership, but the allocation of the 
financial resources is far from being optimal. Notably, the EU is losing money by not 
directly  implementing its programmes, as in the case of TRACECA.92  EU budget 
support in  the region –  mainly through the European Commission Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO) – has also been criticised for being inefficient due to the lack of a 
systematic  evaluation system.93  The financial crisis does not seem to have 
significantly impacted EU policy towards CASC, the EU Delegations have not been 
asked to limit their administrative expenses94 and the opening of new Delegations in 
the region – planned by the Lisbon Treaty – has not been postponed by the budget 
constraints.  
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The EU programmes do not sufficiently complement each other despite the 
fact that they are established by EU actors who allocate the tasks and have a rather 
good understanding of the issues at stake in CASC. This paper suggests that some 
improvements could be made in establishing a coherent EU policy by increasing the 
expertise of the EU actors in the region in order to create a comprehensive strategy 
gathering ambitious complementary programmes. 
The recent increase in funding for the region is a positive sign for the influence 
of the EU policy in the region. The EU has to quicken the mobilisation of the funding 
as it is a factor for the visibility of the EU. “[A]ccordingly, local observers of EU-Central 
Asian relations admit that the visibility of the EU and the impact of its engagement 
are ‘practically zero’. Unlike the EU, Russian and Chinese decision makers are able to 
quickly mobilise the resources necessary to pursue their foreign policy goals”.95 
Indeed, either in terms of funding invested or programmes launched, the EU remains 
a  ductile actor in comparison to  Russia, China and the US.  The EU might better 
understand the inadequacies of this approach if it had decided to implement its 
programmes through its own representatives,96 thus acquiring local expertise, rather 
than resorting  to consultancy.97  A better understanding of the region would likely 
lead the EU to start new ambitious programmes on other subjects that are crucial for 
the stability of the region and thus for EU interests. “In order to make sure that its 
policies have the desired effect, the Union needs to take into account the complex 
realities on the ground.”98  Although  the programmes focusing on ‘hard’  security 
issues, like BOMCA and the Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP),99 have 
been relatively successful,100 the EU has to start investing in programmes that have 
                                                 
95 A. Schmitz, “Whose conditionality? The failure of EU sanctions in Uzbekistan”, Central Asia 
Caucasus Institute, Analyst, 11 November 2009, p. 18. 
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been  neglected until now. For example,  the EU should focus more on the 
management of water in the region because the allocation of water resources is a 
source of conflict.101 The launch of the ‘Environment and Water Initiative’ in 2008 is a 
good but rather late start in this regard. The EU might also strengthen some of its 
programmes which are obviously crucial for the future of the region such as the 
European Education Initiative for Central Asia. Indeed, in a region where more than 
sixty percent of the population is under twenty-five  years old,102  influencing 
education would be a significant asset for the EU. Another option would be to focus 
on health policy,103 even if it has to be done in cooperation with the member states 
which have the prerogative for this policy in Central Asia. 
 
Coherence among the actors of EU policy towards CASC 
  The involvement of the European Commission and the Council in framing and 
executing EU CASC policy – in addition to the remaining prerogatives of member 
states – is in itself a source for horizontal incoherence due to the asymmetry between 
their budget and structure. The ‘EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ 
by the Council and of the ‘EC-Regional Strategy Paper for Assistance to Central Asia 
2007-2013’ by the Commission put forward different priorities. Cremona underlines 
that there might be  “tension that can exist between the different aspects of 
coherence, on the one hand clarity of rules which allocate tasks, delimit 
competences and establish priority between rules in order to avoid inconsistency, 
and on the other coherence through synergy and complementarity”.104  
The EU decision-making process remains highly hierarchical, yet decisions 
taken at the top level are often difficult to implement on the ground and tend to 
result in some inconsistencies among EU actors. The political situation in CASC partly 
explains this difficulty as the EU is supposed to cooperate with the official national 
actors, but these actors often struggle to keep the control over their whole territory 
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facing sometimes infiltration of bordering states or terrorist groups.105  Another 
obstacle to a direct top-down implementation of EU policies is that actors on the 
ground have to face some bargaining by the corrupt authorities. In Kyrgyzstan EU 
actors agreed to “forget about some of the priorities settled by the Council in 
exchange for the use of military bases in the country”.106 
The actors on the ground can also establish priorities for EU action that the 
decision-makers in Brussels are not willing to endorse.  In  Central  Asia, the ‘New 
Partnership’ underlines seven themes: human rights, rule of law, good governance 
and democratisation; youth and education; economic development; strengthening 
energy and transport links; environmental sustainability and water; combating 
common threats and challenges and intercultural dialogue. Kurt Wagner suggests 
that the EU should focus on a smaller number of priorities: education, health and 
economic development.107 The various topics included in the EU strategy towards 
CASC and the fact that the EU defines this strategy by looking mainly at the regional 
level create some room for incoherence between EU actors in Brussels and the ones 
on the ground. However, actors on the ground benefit from the lack of experts 
based in Brussels regarding CASC, and they provide information and advice to the 
actors of the decision-making process.108 
In addition, the status of Special Representatives  remains unclear. Peter 
Semneby, Special Representative for the South Caucasus, and Pierre Morel, Special 
Representative for Central Asia, are connected to Brussels but their role is based on 
multiple interactions with local actors.109 It seems that the Special Representatives 
had to create their own jobs. The lack of clearly defined responsibilities hinders the 
horizontal coherence of the EU.  
Discrepancies  between the European actors involved in the region create 
among other things an issue of vertical incoherence. Vertical incoherence has led to 
periods of ‘non-decision’, namely “a process of mobilizing obstacles which prevent a 
question – in this case the formulation of a unified mode of operation in the South 
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Caucasus […] from appearing on the European common agenda”.110  This 
phenomenon was particularly obvious in the 1990s. Overall, “the European external 
action system –  through its national mode of operation –  has practiced self-
censorship”.111 The EU benefits from one advantage: the fact that the member states 
have been until now relatively absent in the region and that they are facing some 
internal inconsistency,  too.112  Nevertheless, the big member states do have some 
interests at stake: Germany is acting as a leader of the European presence in the 
region while British, French and Dutch companies struggle to control more gas and 
oil resources. Fortunately, as the member states do not consider that the EU threatens 
their national interest in the region, there is a real cooperation between the EU and 
the member states.113 Considering the weak presence of EU member states in the 
region,  with a  focus on energy, it  could  be  expected that  a coherent EU policy 
supported by all member states  can  easily  be  implemented  but  differences 
regarding the relations between the member states and Russia increase the risks of 
an incoherent EU foreign policy in CASC.114  The limited role of the states in the 
implementation of the overall EU  policy has been crucial to keep some vertical 
coherence between the EU and the member states. When launching its 'New 
Partnership' the Council has considered that some improvements can still be carried 
out to increase vertical coherence regarding the programmes and projects being 
implemented.115  
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The Treaty of Lisbon aims at improving the institutional cooperation between 
EU actors.116  By creating  the  post of President of the European  Council and 
enhancing the role of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – 
assisted by the European External Action Service (EEAS) –  the Treaty of Lisbon is 
reducing the potential sources of horizontal incoherence between the Commission 
and the Council.117  Previously the Council decisions on establishing the external 
policy agenda were mainly taken by the rotating Presidency of the Council which 
was suspected of pursuing a national/regional agenda118 that did not lead to the 
establishment of a long-term coherent strategy.119  The High Representative is 
considered by some EU actors as doing a good job to increase the coherence and 
the visibility of the EU in the region by issuing rapidly well-informed declarations which 
bond all EU actors.120 The horizontal coherence of the EU has been strengthened by 
the Lisbon Treaty which ends the ‘pillar structure’ and introduces  an EU legal 
personality.121 
Among the new tools created by the Lisbon Treaty is the Foreign Policy 
Instruments Service (FPIS) that originally lacked a clear management according to 
the head of the operation section in Kyrgyzstan.122 In fact, the FPIS has proven to be 
useful for the EU action on the ground for some of the countries in CASC as there are 
now direct offices to contact for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Georgia, a tool which 
reduces the time to get an authorisation to implement or modify a policy for the 
Delegation.123 In the field, the Lisbon Treaty has eased the work of the EU Delegations 
by enabling them to create, for example, study groups without any authorisation. 
According to the head of the political section of the EU Delegation in Kazakhstan, 
the latitude of the Delegation has grown since the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty  as the latter  increases the coordination and representation duties of the 
Delegations.124 This upgrade of the EU Delegation improves the EU’s visibility on the 
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ground as there is now one permanent telephone number to join the EU for the local 
actors.125  In terms of vertical coherence, the involvement of EU member state 
diplomats in the EEAS also strengthens the arguments of the EU Delegation to ask for 
the cooperation of the member states.126  The Lisbon Treaty also underlines the 
importance of the neighbourhood  policy as “[t]he Union shall develop a special 
relationship with neighbouring countries”.127  The Treaty of Lisbon has undoubtedly 
introduced useful changes able to increase the coherence of EU foreign policy; but 
only additional political will might bring more coherence in EU external action.128  
Currently the EU has both an institutional decisional system likely to cause 
horizontal coherence and a new Treaty likely to increase the vertical and horizontal 
coherence of the EU policy in CASC. By avoiding the publication of different 
strategies towards the same region at the same time and by establishing a close and 
frequent cooperation on the ground between the EU and the members state 
representatives the overall coherence of the EU policy is likely to increase. In order for 
the Lisbon Treaty to become an asset of a coherent EU foreign policy, the EU actors 
need to have the political will to use the Treaty for this purpose. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined  to  what extent the EU’s  policy  towards CASC is 
coherent by analysing the making and implementation of this EU policy. It showed 
that the EU’s policy towards CASC is not fully coherent nor sufficiently visible. The EU 
has not introduced any hierarchy between its objectives, but implements 
programmes and initiatives at various levels. Currently, the Arab Spring is challenging 
the EU’s role in democratising authoritarian regimes all over the world.129 The EU has 
to decide whether it considers that it can impact on or at least prepare for such 
changes, or whether  democratisation is –  in  the end –  an internal process. This 
decision will influence the creation of a renewed EU interest or a relative disinterest 
towards the CASC region. 
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The current ‘Great Game’ in CASC leaves an opportunity for the EU to gain 
greater influence in the region. The EU already benefits from its ‘soft power’ status. 
Russia, China and the US have failed until now in creating and implementing 
adequate coherent policies towards CASC. The EU has been more successful in 
establishing the grounds for a possibly  coherent  policy towards CASC. The EU 
possesses a rather good understanding of the issues at stake in the region, it has 
allocated the implementation of its policies without major inconsistencies and it has 
been able to create successful multilateral initiatives. Overall, the main reason for the 
relative coherence of the EU policy towards CASC is the modesty of its policy. The 
limited national interests for the member states in the region, and the focus of the EU 
on the candidates to EU enlargement have led to a rather coherent and rather 
limited EU policy towards CASC.  
Now that the budget towards the region increases,  the geopolitical 
competition in the region is likely to increase and the EU has to rethink a foreign 
policy (without the asset of EU enlargement),  the  ability of the EU policy towards 
CASC to remain coherent is crucial.  According to Koehler,  “coherence in the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy at national level also constitutes an 
exception rather than the norm”.130  To the extent that the EU has managed to 
appear as an actor different from states and different from international 
organisations, being coherent both in policy and action could become a rather 
useful trademark.  
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